INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to investigate, first, whether Canada and Mexico are indeed suffering from Dutch disease, and second, whether a North American Monetary Union (NAMU) is a viable solution-or whether this "cure" might be worse than the disease. On the first point, the data we will review below show that both the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso have appreciated in real terms over the past decade, and that these real appreciations have been associated with declines (either relative or absolute) in manufacturing output and employment in each country. The recent surge in real oil prices to levels not seen since the late 1970s (see Figure 1 ) makes the Dutch disease hypothesis a plausible explanation for these phenomena.
However, since both currencies began to appreciate prior to the latest upsurge in oil prices, it is likely that other factors, particularly monetary policies, have also been important causes of the rising values of the Canadian and Mexican currencies, although there is somewhat stronger evidence for the Dutch disease diagnosis for Canada than for Mexico.
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Assuming that there is some truth to the Dutch disease diagnosis, the prescription of a NAMU has a fairly obvious logic: since the North American economy as a whole (which is dominated by the US) is not a major net exporter of oil, gas, and other primary commodities, a single North American currency would be unlikely to appreciate in response to a boom in energy and commodity prices. However, the potential gains for Canada and Mexico from eliminating exchange rate fluctuations driven by resource prices could be offset, depending on the exchange rate parities at which the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso would be converted to a new North American currency or (under some scenarios) to the US dollar, as well as the exchange rates that would then prevail between the North American currency and currencies in other global regions.
Furthermore, advocates of a NAMU for combating Dutch disease ignore a simpler alternative, which would be to adopt monetary policies that would act to offset the pressure for exchange rate appreciation in response to a natural resource boom.
Also, based on the precedent of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the type of fiscal policies that the member countries would be allowed to pursue and the nature of the monetary policy that the regional central bank would follow are important determinants of how a monetary union would affect its member countries. Ironically, both Canada and Mexico currently (and independently) follow monetary and fiscal policies that are similar in spirit (if not in exact design) to those of the EMU: their monetary policies are focused mainly on controlling inflation, 3 while their fiscal policies are targeted on preventing large budget deficits or achieving surpluses. How a NAMU would be regulated in this regard-what sort of monetary policy its central bank would follow, and what sorts of fiscal policies it would allow its member stateswould therefore be a critical factor affecting whether the cure of monetary integration would be worse than the disease of an overly strong currency.
Although enthusiasm for a NAMU has waned at present, the proposals for creating one have engendered a significant amount of analysis and discussion that have, at least, clarified some of the likely parameters if a NAMU is ever to be formed. Unlike in the EMU, where the countries are more similar in size, the extreme asymmetries in North America-where Canada and Mexico's gross domestic products (GDPs) are, respectively, only 8 and 6 percent of US GDP-seem likely to ensure a subordinate role for these two countries in the formulation of monetary policy in a NAMU. Many observers have argued that the US would be unlikely to want to create a new, euro-like North American currency, and hence the formation of a NAMU would mean that Canada and Mexico would have to adopt the US dollar. This could be done unilaterally by each country, in which case it would be called "dollarization," but it could also be accomplished by expanding the US Federal Reserve System (Fed) to include Canada and Mexico. More specifically, some have argued that Mexico and Canada would essentially have to become mere Fed districts, similar to the existing 12 regional Feds in the US-with at most one seat on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) for each country. 4 Even if a new North American currency and North American Central Bank (NACB) were created, the profound asymmetries in North America make it likely that US interests would still have a preponderant role in setting monetary policies (Smith 2002) . Needless to say, the prospect of such a diminished role for Canadians and Mexicans in setting their own monetary policies has diminished support for a NAMU in their respective countries; in effect, a NAMU that was politically acceptable in the US might not be politically acceptable in the other two countries.
Nevertheless, the idea of taking monetary policy even further out of the hands of national political leaders could still be appealing to business interests and free-market ideologists in Exchange rate hedging is commonplace, and companies can shield themselves over a short period by various currency options. These special administrative and transactions costs are faced only by business enterprises engaged in foreign trade, thereby making the latter more receptive to any proposal that would eliminate such costs. 6 Advocates of greater monetary integration have, therefore, traditionally emphasized the argument for the static efficiency gains from the reduction of transactions costs, relating not only to the elimination of exchange rate risk for business firms, but also to the elimination of the costs of converting currencies for the millions of Canadians who travel regularly to the US and Mexico for work or pleasure.
In addition to eliminating certain transactions costs, those partial to greater monetary integration have at times referred to at least one other important benefit of a NAMU that is often connected with the name of Robert Mundell, who argued that the regional configuration of a currency area is very important. Canada is characterized by a great diversity of industries across regions, such as manufacturing in Ontario (where growth depends on low energy costs) and oil in Alberta (where economic performance depends on high energy prices). A common external shock to these regions, such as a major jump in the international price of oil, naturally hurts Ontario manufacturers and benefits Alberta's oil producers. However, the existence of a floating exchange rate only compounds the negative effect on Ontario exporters, since Canada's exchange rate also faces upward pressure from the rising price of oil. In this case, Ontario manufacturing exporters would be better off either with a fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the principal importer of Canada's exports-the US-or with an outright monetary union. On the assumption that Canada is not an "optimal currency area" (OCA) but, somehow, North America is, the abandonment of Canada's floating exchange rate in favor of greater monetary integration could be viewed as beneficial to Canadian manufacturing exports.
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Interestingly, with a falling nominal and real exchange rate during the pre-2002 period, it was the former argument over the need to eliminate the above-mentioned transactions costs for
Canadian consumers and the exchange-rate risk to exporting firms (much as the euro had been sold to the Europeans-see Emerson et al. 1992 ) that held sway. However, since 2002, with rising international energy prices accompanied by the meteoric rise in the Canadian dollar, it is the Mundellian argument relating to OCAs that now seems to be in vogue among those partial to greater monetary integration. In the Canadian media, this has been associated with the debate over whether Canada is being afflicted by the Dutch disease. Some are now pointing to the floating Canadian dollar as the cause of a similar growing distress in Canada's manufacturing sector. Since this controversy over the role of Canada's exchange rate hinges on whether or not the Canadian dollar has become strongly sensitive to fluctuations in international oil prices, let us first discuss briefly the debate over the growing importance of energy in the determination of Canada's exchange rate.
Is the Canadian Dollar a Commodity Currency or a Petro-Currency?
As displayed in Figure 2 , the Canadian dollar was roughly at par with the US dollar in nominal terms at the end of the Bretton Woods era. Starting in the mid-1970s, the Canadian dollar went through two successive waves of depreciation until it hit bottom at the beginning of 2002. The first wave was associated with the oil price shocks of the 1970s followed by the major recession of the early 1980s. As the only one of the G-7 industrialized nations that is a major net exporter of primary products (with primary commodities constituting somewhat less than one-third of Canada's overall merchandise exports), Canada was hit badly not only by the oil price hikes that caused havoc in its industrial heartland, but also by the subsequent slump in primary commodity prices internationally, as industrial economies faced slower growth and descended into recession.
[ The combined effects of interest rates and commodity prices are reflected in an econometric equation developed by researchers at the Bank of Canada to forecast the evolution of the Canada-US exchange rate (see Murray et al. 2003) . According to the Bank of Canada equation, the Canada-US exchange rate depends on three key market "fundamentals": a primary commodity price index (excluding energy), an energy price index (mainly oil, natural gas, and electricity), and a measure of the Canada-US short-term interest rate differential (the difference in the Canada-US 90-day commercial paper rates). Estimates of this equation have always shown that an increase in (non-energy) international commodity prices and an increase in Canadian short-term interest rates vis-à-vis US rates lead to an appreciation of the Canadian dollar, as expected. However, the results concerning the role of energy prices in influencing Canada's exchange rate have varied over time. In the original estimates based mainly on the experience of the pre-1990s era, an increase in world energy prices, after controlling for the other variables, was found to lead to depreciation in the international value of the Canadian dollar (Murray et al. 2003 (Issa, et al. 2006 ).
Since the 1990s, however, Canada has become a significant energy exporter in the context of the North American energy market, the development of which was first facilitated by the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement of 1989 and subsequently reinforced under NAFTA.
Because of Canada's vast oil sands reserves (officially second only to Saudi Arabia's conventional reserves) and the new continental energy environment, when the price of oil goes up, this now pushes up the demand for Canadian dollars and therefore leads to an appreciation in the international value of Canada's currency-as is now confirmed by more recent estimates of the Bank of Canada exchange rate equation and other estimates (Issa, et al. 2006; Bayoumi and Mühleisen 2006) . Some have therefore suggested that, given the growing importance of energy exports, Canadian industry is now ailing from Dutch disease-i.e., a jump in the international price of oil puts upward pressure on the Canadian dollar and bleeds manufacturing exports. In light of this, it would seem that the continued rise in Canada's "petrocurrency" accompanying the increasing price of oil in recent years spells difficult times ahead for Canada's manufacturing sector, although the Bank of Canada exchange rate equation suggests that looser monetary policy (a lowering of Canadian interest rates relative to US rates) could help to prevent this.
The Dutch Disease in Canada
In the media, there are numerous examples that provide anecdotal evidence of serious problems faced by Canadian firms resulting from the high exchange rate. One striking example that has made headlines is the Canadian movie industry-"Hollywood North"-which grew rapidly under the protection of a low Canadian dollar but is now being seriously battered by its appreciation. However, the most strongly hit sector is manufacturing, which, in absolute terms, Nevertheless, if the oil-and-commodity boom does indeed turn out to be a curse, then policy makers will surely want to find remedies to this problem. Policies such as limiting wage growth (to ensure that unit labor costs do not rise thereby further compounding the problem of declining competitiveness) or limiting public and private spending in an overheated economy (so as to curb inflationary pressures) have been proposed. But these measures are hardly more than what the Bank of Canada already does indirectly though its inflation targeting monetary policy, which (as argued above) has merely worsened the problem of an overvalued currency. A more interesting proposal, based on the Norwegian experience, is to constitute a separate petroleum fund financed by oil revenues upon which governments could rely so as to intervene and compensate sectors that are suffering as a result of the Dutch disease (Tremblay 2008) . However, this could become a jurisdictional nightmare, not unlike the federal National Energy Policy of the early 1980s, because of the federal-provincial squabbling that would inevitably ensue.
An alternative and more straightforward solution to the problem of the ailing Canadian manufacturing sector would be to do away with the exchange rate-and the Canadian dollaraltogether! Needless to say, this is what would be preferred by all those partial to greater monetary integration (Courchene 2007 (Courchene , 2008 Grubel 2008) . In principle, any one country in a currency union can be effectively insulated from Dutch disease, as long as the other member countries are not specialized in the same energy or commodity exports, and as long as the conversion to a single currency occurs at a competitive exchange rate. Could a monetary union therefore be the appropriate response to the alleged Dutch disease problem for Canada, or could it turn out to be worse than the disease itself? We shall discuss this question below, after we turn to an examination of these same issues in Mexico.
MEXICAN PERSPECTIVES
In Mexico, as in Canada, enthusiasm for a possible monetary union or dollarization policy has receded since it peaked around 2000. In the late 1990s, the apparent success of NAFTA in stimulating trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) led some Mexican business interests to promote a monetary union as the next step in the country's regional integration. 10 At that point, memories of the 1994-95 peso crisis were still fresh, and a monetary union was seen as a way of stabilizing the Mexican financial system and preventing another crisis. A monetary union was also seen as a means of ensuring price stability in a country where inflation had risen to a 35 percent annual rate in 1995 following the devaluation of the peso, and did not return to a single digit rate until 2000 (when it was a still high 9.5 percent). Since the US dollar was strong at the time, inflation hawks were interested in linking Mexico's currency to a stronger one (or simply adopting the latter). Moreover, the launch of the euro in 1999 naturally led to interest in emulating Europe's monetary integration in Mexico as well as in Canada.
Some of the reasons why Mexicans subsequently lost interest in a NAMU are well known, and mostly (although not entirely) political. sharp lesson that such a policy was no sure route to financial stability.
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Macroeconomic Stabilization and Slow Growth in Mexico
The economic incentives for Mexico to seek a monetary union have also diminished since 2000.
Given Mexico's history of recurrent financial and currency crises from the 1970s to the 1990s, the attraction of a monetary union derived mainly from the promise of greater macroeconomic and financial stability, rather than from the more conventional efficiency gains contemplated in the concept of an OCA or the reduced "nuisance costs" that were formerly seen as most important in Canada. However, the Mexican government has achieved macroeconomic stabilization via other means, thereby lessening interest in a monetary union or dollarization.
In 2000, the Banco de México set a goal of making the country's inflation rate converge with US inflation (about 3 percent annually). 14 In combination with fiscal restraint, this inflation- Mexico's real exchange rate has also stabilized to a remarkable degree in the past few years. As can be seen in Figure 5 , the peso exhibited tremendous volatility from the 1970s to the 1990s, with repeated real appreciations and crashes mirroring the boom-bust cycles in the Mexican economy. Since the early 2000s, the peso has fluctuated within much narrower bands than in the past, especially bilaterally with the US dollar. However, as Figure 5 also shows, the peso has stabilized in a zone where its real value is close to the pre-crisis peak levels of 1993-94, and far above its level in the late 1990s when Mexico enjoyed a brief export-led, post-NAFTA boom. Thus, the peso is again at a level that can be considered overvalued, and as a result
Mexico's export-led growth model has faltered (see Blecker 2008) .
[ Figure 5 about here]
Indeed, Mexico's macroeconomic stabilization has been achieved at a considerable cost in terms of both slow short-run growth and limited progress toward long-term development goals. While developing countries in south and east Asia (for example, India and China) have been growing at annual rates in the range of 6-10 percent, Mexico has been lucky to reach a 4 percent annual growth rate of GDP in the last few years. Since Mexico opened its economy in 1987, its growth rate has averaged only 3.1 percent per year (in 1987-2007) 
Dutch Disease in Mexico?
Since a brief oil boom in the late 1970s-which ended abruptly in the debt crisis of 1982-86-Mexico has become increasingly specialized in manufactured exports, which reached a peak of about 85 percent of the value of total exports in 1998-2001. 19 Nevertheless, Mexico remains a significant oil exporter, and the importance of oil exports has revived along with the high prices of the past few years. The Dutch disease concept is therefore possibly relevant to Mexico, especially if it is widened to incorporate other sources of sudden windfalls of foreign exchange inflows that Mexico has experienced, such as the "hot money" financial investments of the early 1990s and more recently the upsurge in remittances from migrant workers in the US.
The same Bank of Canada research team that has developed an econometric equation for Canada's real exchange rate has also developed a parallel one for Mexico (see Murray et al. 2003) . from migrant workers would have analogous effects to inflows of oil export revenue. However, interest rate differentials also affect the Mexican-US exchange rate, as they do the Canadian-US rate. Thus, monetary policy and oil prices both affect the value of the peso.
As noted above, the peso has leveled off at a real exchange rate that makes Mexico a relatively uncompetitive location for export production and export-oriented FDI, especially in manufactures. 20 As a result of the once-again overvalued peso, Mexico's non-oil export revenue has grown slowly and its FDI inflows have stagnated since the early 2000s. Moreover, manufacturing employment-which Mexico had hoped would grow strongly following the creation of NAFTA-has stagnated, if not actually declined, in recent years. Although comprehensive annual data on Mexican manufacturing employment comparable to those shown in Figure 3 for Canada are not available, the best available estimates show that the number of manufacturing jobs has fallen since peaking in 2000. Figure 6 shows that manufacturing employment in Mexico has declined since that time in both the export-oriented maquiladoras and other (non-maquiladora) manufacturing industries-more so in the latter, which produce for both export and domestic markets, but also in the former. This stagnation and decline in manufacturing employment corresponds to the period when the peso became chronically overvalued, as shown in Figure 5 .
[ Figure 6 about here]
Since the employment levels shown in Figure 6 are based on partial surveys, a more global measure of manufacturing output (as a percentage of GDP) is shown in Figure 7 . The manufacturing share of GDP increased significantly in the late 1990s following the adoption of NAFTA (and while the peso was temporarily lower), but then declined back to its previous level after the peso appreciated in the early 2000s. However, as in the case of Canada, it remains to be seen to what extent the real appreciation of the peso can be attributed to higher oil prices, as is required for a Dutch disease diagnosis. Most of the rise in the peso occurred between about 1999 and 2002 (see Figure 5 ), before the boom in oil prices which really didn't take off until late 2004.
In fact, the peso exhibits remarkable stability during the years of the recent jump in oil prices, although this could be due in part to Banco de México purchases of foreign exchange reserves that have prevented the peso from rising more. 21 Furthermore, the stagnation of manufacturing employment and the decline in the manufacturing share of GDP both began several years before the big increases in oil prices in 2004-8. Thus, while Mexico exhibits some symptoms of the Dutch disease, the application of this diagnosis remains at best uncertain.
[ Figure 7 about here]
A Note on Mexico's Cross-Exchange Rate and Transportation Costs
Since the peso has been relatively stable in terms of the US dollar over the past several years while the latter has been declining in value vis-à-vis the European currencies and Canadian dollar, the peso has effectively depreciated relative to other (non-US dollar) floating rate currencies. Thus, the peso fell more on a multilateral basis between 2003 and 2008 than it did bilaterally with the US dollar (see Figure 5 ). This may help Mexican exports to some extent, but Gallagher et al. 2008 ).
Of course, China's wages would still be an order of magnitude lower than Mexico's at any conceivable exchange rate, and China has used more activist industrial policies to promote exports compared with Mexico's more "neo-liberal" approach during the past two decades. But forming a monetary union with the US would prevent Mexico from devaluing relative to the US dollar in an effort to become more competitive vis-à-vis the Asian exporters, an option that Mexico still retains even if it has chosen not to exercise it. Paradoxically, then, the formation of a NAMU could put another nail in the coffin of the NAFTA trade strategy, in which Mexico sought to become a manufacturing export powerhouse (and to create large numbers of industrial jobs) by attracting massive amounts of export-oriented FDI.
However, Mexico's unique geographic advantage as a semi-industrialized nation located next to the US implies that Mexico may obtain a unique benefit from high energy costs that has been little noticed until recently. High energy costs have significantly raised international transportation costs, which in turn are making some imports from China and other Asian countries less competitive in the North American market. This is leading some international companies to consider moving "outsourced" production back to Mexico, although the heaviest goods (such as steel) may be produced in the US itself (see Rubin and Tal 2008) .
WOULD A NAMU SOLVE THE DUTCH DISEASE PROBLEM FOR CANADA AND MEXICO?
It is of course true that creating a supranational North American currency comparable to the euro, such as the "amero" proposed by Grubel (1999) -or even the adoption of the US dollar by
Canada and Mexico-would protect Canadian and Mexican industries from future increases in their countries' exchange rates. However, adopting a single regional currency would not protect the industries of the member countries from future increases in the value of that currency relative to other national or regional currencies, such as the euro, British pound, and Japanese yen. For both Canada and Mexico, however, the US is by far their largest trading partner, so those fluctuations might not be as important for them as they would be for other countries that might want to link to the US dollar-as, for example, when Argentina adopted its fixed (1:1) pesodollar exchange rate, in spite of having relatively little trade with the US.
In terms of avoiding Dutch disease, North America as a whole has a pattern of trade and migration flows that would probably dampen fluctuations in the value of a single regional currency related to energy prices and worker remittances. 25 If anything, the three NAFTA countries combined are probably net importers of energy products, since the US absorbs most of Canada and Mexico's oil and gas exports but still buys about two-thirds of its imported oil from other countries. 26 Since so much of the three countries' energy trade is intra-regional, global "oil shocks" would probably have much less impact on the exchange rate of the North American single currency (amero or dollar) with other global currencies than it presently has on the exchange rates of the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso.
By the same token, however, fixing the Canadian and Mexican exchange rates permanently to the US dollar (or to a new currency) would prevent those rates from depreciating in the event of unfavorable "shocks," including future declines in oil prices. Unless a compensating regional fiscal transfer mechanism was put in place (an unlikely prospect), Canada and Mexico would suffer more severe adjustment costs when hit by those sorts of shocks. This is especially true because the US is a large net importer of oil and other commodities from non-NAFTA countries, and hence would benefit from such a supply shock that was detrimental to This would permanently institutionalize the negative effects of the Dutch disease in both countries-or else it would require severe deflation to adjust to the fixed conversion rates, not unlike what happened when Britain pegged the pound to gold at an overvalued rate after World War I, as famously described by Keynes (1925) . 28 Therefore, it would be a profound and tragic mistake to lock-in the present, overvalued exchange rates in a NAMU in the name of preventing an epidemic of Dutch disease that has already broken out.
Fiscal and Monetary Policies Under a NAMU
There is, however, a further problem concerning whether an EMU-type arrangement would be a positive improvement over the current status quo of independent floating exchange rates for Canada and Mexico. As pointed out elsewhere (see Seccareccia and Lequain 2006) , the establishment of the euro has been an historic monetary experiment that, some have argued, for the first time in centuries has given birth to a monetary system that formally separates money from the individual nation state. The policy system that underlies the two main pillars of the EMU-the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Amsterdam Stability and Growth Pact (1997)-was put in place specifically to secure this separation. This has meant a complete loss of the two principal instruments of macroeconomic stabilization policy-discretionary fiscal and monetary policy-at the national level.
According to the rules of the Treaty, fiscal policy is supposed to be severely constrained.
Governments of EMU member states not only must fulfill the two fiscal requirements of keeping budget deficits within 3 percent of GDP and public debt-to-GDP ratios within a 60 percent of GDP ceiling, but also are required to target zero budget balances over the medium term.
Supposedly, strong sanctions are imposed against those who do not meet these legal obligations, unless countries file cumbersome petitions for exceptions under the "severe recession" clause of the Treaty. There have been some prominent short-term violations of the 3 percent rule, however, and these have not always been subject to the legally mandated penalties-which suggests that the legal framework for fiscal policy in the EMU is impractical and unrealistic.
Nevertheless, the Maastricht Treaty militates against the regular and accepted use of countercyclical fiscal policy, even if some countries follow its mandates more strictly than others.
With the practical disappearance of activist fiscal policy as tool for macroeconomic stabilization for the current twelve member states, control over the macroeconomy rests almost exclusively on monetary policy conducted by the ECB-a supranational, independent institution over which the European Parliament has no direct power. Hence, if such an EMU structure were to be parachuted into the North American context, more active fiscal policy would no longer be possible in any one NAMU member. With a "one shoe fits all" monetary policy within the NAMU, the NACB (or expanded Fed) would not cater sufficiently to Canada's or Mexico's regional needs, since the latter countries would, as noted earlier, probably hold only one seat each on the governing board of a NACB or an expanded FOMC.
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However, North America is not Europe, and the likely predominance of the US in a NAMU would create some special opportunities and challenges for the two smaller partners. In terms of monetary policy, the Fed has shown itself to be more willing to adopt countercyclical interest rate cuts during recessions than the ECB, which only targets price stability. Even though the Fed is strictly concerned with US business cycle conditions at present, Canada and Mexico nevertheless benefit from the Fed's more flexible stance to the extent that their business cycles are positively correlated with US cycles. 30 If Mexico and Canada were to join a NAMU in which the central bank (NACB or expanded Fed) followed current Fed procedures, those countries would actually be subject to a less strict inflation-targeting monetary policy than they currently have today. Nevertheless, they would not give up inflation control, since the Fed-in spite of its lack of official inflation targets and its relatively greater flexibility-has effectively contained US inflation within rather narrow bands (about 2-4 percent per year) since the early 1990s.
It is unclear whether Canada and Mexico would have to agree to strict fiscal targets in a NAMU, similar to those that have been imposed on EMU members. On the one hand, the US is unlikely to want to tie its own hands by giving up the right to run large budget deficits or to have the Fed hold US government debt. Therefore, if Mexico and Canada were to be treated as coequals with the US, they should not be subject to any fiscal restrictions as a condition of joining a NAMU or having a seat on the FOMC. On the other hand, insofar as Mexico and Canada might be treated as mere Fed districts, they could possibly be required to have balanced budgets or to meet certain arbitrary fiscal targets, more on the model of the US states, which cannot run current budget deficits as the US federal government can. It is possible that an expanded North American Fed or NACB would not be allowed to hold Canadian or Mexican government debt, and that the Bank of Canada and Banco de México might similarly be prohibited from doing so (although the Banco de México does not currently hold any Mexican government debt anyway).
In some ways, Mexico would have an easy time adjusting to EMU-like fiscal restrictions today, because the Mexican government already operates a fiscal policy that targets the fiscal balance itself, and which is therefore procyclical rather than countercyclical (see Moreno-Brid and Ros 2008: Ch 8; Esquivel 2008) . Furthermore, the procyclical bias of Mexican fiscal policy is amplified by the reliance of the government on the national oil company Pemex for a substantial part of its tax revenue (see Puyana 2006) . But for this very reason, a monetary union could lock-in a type of fiscal policy that Mexico would otherwise retain the option of changing in the future (for example, if the country were to focus more on infrastructure investments aimed at promoting long-run development, and stop targeting the fiscal balance itself).
Indeed, one should not discount the possibility that, at some future time, some interests in Mexico might seek a NAMU as a means of locking in the current monetary and fiscal policy regime. After all, one of the chief arguments in favor of NAFTA in the early 1990s was precisely that it would lock-in Mexico's liberalizing reforms of the late 1980s, especially the opening to foreign trade and investment, by preventing future Mexican governments from abandoning the country's commitment to liberalized trade and investment policies (Lustig 1998) . A similar case could be made by proponents of the current macro policies, in the not-too-distant future, that
Mexico should similarly lock-in its commitments to price stability and a balanced government budget by joining a monetary union that would force it to maintain those commitments in perpetuity-especially if there appeared to be a realistic prospect of a future left-wing government that might seek to change those policy priorities-as noted previously by Bowles and Moreno-Brid (2008: 137) .
Canada also would not encounter any significant political or institutional barriers in abiding by EMU-style fiscal rules under present conditions. In the Canadian context, successive governments since the mid-1990s have been committed not only to balanced budgets, but also to targeting budget surpluses so as to achieve a pre-established, long-term decline in the ratio of federal debt to GDP. As shown elsewhere, these persistent federal surpluses have been achieved at the cost of destabilizing private household finances, thereby leading to ever declining personal saving rates and rising household indebtedness (Seccareccia 2005) . In much the same way, on the monetary front, Canada's central bank has already achieved the EMU's commitment to price stability via its official inflation targeting and, much like the federal government's commitment to "sound finance" and fiscal surpluses, the Bank of Canada has been officially targeting a 2 percent inflation rate over the last fifteen years or so.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence for countercyclical fiscal policy in Canada, in spite of the high average level of the budget surplus. According to Seccareccia and Lequain (2006) , primary (cyclically adjusted) fiscal balances respond negatively to the unemployment rate in both Canada and the US, unlike in the EMU where the authors find a somewhat perverse positive response. Therefore, if a NAMU imposed any restrictions on Canada's fiscal autonomy, it could lessen the ability of the Canadian government to adopt countercyclical fiscal policies attuned to short-run conditions in the Canadian economy (and it would also prevent Canada from rethinking its current commitment to long-run, average budget surpluses).
CONCLUSIONS
Both Canada and Mexico have experienced currency appreciations in recent years that have stymied the growth of their manufacturing sectors and reduced manufacturing employment.
Since oil prices have also risen rapidly in recent years, some observers have leapt to the conclusion that these countries are suffering from Dutch disease, and that monetary integration with the US might be a solution. In the Mexican case, however, the currency appreciation largely preceded the rapid increase in oil prices (though there is some evidence of the central bank resisting further upward pressure on the peso by buying foreign exchange reserves), while in Courchene (1999 Courchene ( , 2007 Courchene ( , and 2008 and Grubel (2008) ; see also Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) , who argue to the contrary that North America is not an OCA. Indeed, as emphasized by McKinnon (2000), Mundell's (1961) original insight was to show that OCAs ought to be smaller rather than larger. Both Mundell (1961) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) argue that, based on OCA criteria, North America should be divided north-south instead of east-west in terms of optimal currency zones. Hence, OCA criteria traditionally do not favor a large North American currency area as some current supporters of greater monetary integration have argued. Galindo and Ros (2008) find evidence that the Banco de México has followed an asymmetrical monetary policy that is biased toward peso appreciation, in the sense that the Banco generally tightens credit when the peso is falling but does not loosen credit when the peso is rising. But see the next note for possibly contrary evidence, which suggests that the Banco has attempted to limit the appreciation of the peso to some extent. 22 See Blecker and Razmi (2008) and Razmi and Blecker (2008) on how changes in real crossexchange rates among semi-industrialized countries (including Mexico) foster a "fallacy of composition" that limits these countries' ability to simultaneously pursue export-led growth. . 24 The real value of the yuan relative to the peso fell by 31 percent from its peak in the fourth quarter of 1995 (following China's currency reform of 1994 and Mexico's peso crisis in 1994-95) to the fourth quarter of 2007, as measured by EP China /P Mex , where E is the nominal exchange rate (period average) in pesos/yuan (calculated by the ratio of pesos/US dollar to yuan/US dollar) and P i is the consumer price index for country i (data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics). Chinese inflation exceeded Mexican inflation in 2007-8, but not by enough to reverse more than a decade of relatively lower average price increases in China. 25 As already alluded to in note 7 above, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) found that the effects of supply shocks vary not only between Canada, Mexico, and the US, but also across regions of each country, with resource-exporting regions in each country experiencing shocks that are more correlated on a north-south basis-that is to say, correlated with those of similar regions in the other countries than with other regions in their own country. 27 See also Murray, et al. (2003) , who emphasize importance of the shock-absorbing role of the floating exchange rate in Canada, and who also note that Mexico's adherence to a fixed nominal exchange rate in the past contributed to its repeated economic crises.
28 Keynes (1925) attacked Winston Churchill's policy of returning Britain to the gold standard in 1925 and argued against the deflationary consequences of the British pound's return to its prewar parity. One could also argue that Germany joined the EMU at an overvalued exchange rate for the deutschemark in the 1990s, following German reunification, with adverse consequences for the German economy (we are indebted to Ellen Meade for suggesting this point).
29 For a discussion of the problems faced by policy makers when trying to implement a "one shoe fits all" monetary policy in a non-optimal currency area, see Palley (2003) . 30 This positive correlation has existed between Canada and the US for several decades, but is a relatively recent phenomenon for Mexico and the US, and may be diminishing for Canada and the US. Although Canada's business cycles have been strongly synchronized with those of the US in the past, this has changed over the last two decades. For example, Canada suffered a more severe "Made in Canada" recession in 1990-91 with only a milder counterpart in the US, while the latter went through a recession in 2001 when Canada experienced only slower growth but not an actual fall in output. To the extent that the US and Canada are now experiencing different shocks, of course, they represent less of a potential OCA than before. For Mexico, the correlation is strong and significant only since the formation of NAFTA and the end of the peso crisis (i.e., since the late 1990s). See Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2004) , Blecker (2005 Blecker ( , 2008 , Lederman (2005) , and Mejía Reyes, et al. (2006) . Since both Canada and Mexico sell upwards of 80 percent of their exports in the US market, however, any stabilization of the US economy is bound to help at least the export-oriented sectors of those two countries. Jan-87 Jan-89 Jan-91 Jan-93 Jan-95 Jan-97 Jan-99 Jan-01 Jan-03 Jan-05 Jan-07 % of total employment Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM II Series V13682073 and V13682079, and authors' calculations. Real gross domestic product of total business and manufacturing sectors, Canada, annually, 1987 Canada, annually, -2008 Canada, annually, (indexes, 2002 Figure 6 Employment in Mexican manufacturing, maquiladora and non-maquiladora industries, annual averages of monthly survey data, 1993-2007 
